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Special Comment
By CAPTAIN GEORGE D. SCHRADER*
THE MILITARY TRIAL JUDGE
Since the adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
there have been revisions and changes made by Congress and the
Court of Military Appeals. Yet it is doubtful if the proper level
of maturity has been achieved. In this regard it appears that there
has been a tendency during the past several years to afford
greater protection for the rights of the individual.
2 However,
this has caused an increasing administrative burden in pretrial,
trial, and post trial proceedings. The additional paperwork
problem has generated the fear of a complete or partial mal-
function of the system in case of a large mobilization or actual
war.3 Therefore after over twelve years of operation perhaps it
is time to re-evaluate the Code and its procedural aspects to see
if there is some area where the administrative burden can be
reduced without jeopardizing the rights of the individuals who
come before military tribunals seeking justice. Certainly, if the
Military Justice procedure can be streamlined with a view to
functioning under more adverse conditions then it may strengthen
the entire system and afford even more of a guarantee or
protection for the rights of the accused.
Under our present system with the new non-judicial punish-
ment amendments, utilization of the summary court-martial has
been reduced.4 In addition the special court-martial has never
* The author is a graduate of the University of Kentucky College of Law,
and a member of the Bar of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Captain Schrader
is as:signed to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters Air Force
Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.
1 50 U.S.C. §§ 551-736 (1958).
2 Quinn, The United States Court of Military Appeals and the Individual
Rights in the Military Service, 35 N.D. Lawyer 491 (1960). See also 109 Cong.
Rec. 1:350-13368 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1963).
3 Arnow, The Uniform Code of Military justice: It Should Be Improved Now,
48 A.B.A.J. 647 (July 1962): Richardson, A State of War and the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, 47 A.B.A.J. 792 (August 1961). Contra, Learner, Uniform
Code of Military justice: It Will Work During a State of War, 47 A.B.A.J. 1092
(November 1961); Cobbs, The Uniform Code of Military Justice in Wartime-
Another View, 48 A.B.A.J. 1123 (December 1962).
4 Pub. L. 87-648 (76 Stat. 447; 10 USC 815 Art. 15), Air Force Times Sept.
4, 1963.
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been an adequate judicial tribunal. For example, the United
States Army does not authorize the use of court reporters in a
special court-martial, thus a punitive discharge cannot be ad-
judged because there is no verbatim record, as required by Article
19 of the Code. The Air Force makes court reporters available
for special courts-martial and a verbatim record can be obtained.
Hence the court may adjudge a punitive discharge if it is author-
ized by the table of maximum punishment. It is also Air Force
policy that, if available, certified judge advocates -are assigned as
trial and defense counsel in special courts-martial. However, the
president of the court, who is a layman, rules on matters of
evidence and on motions subject to the objection of members of
the court. From the standpoint of the accused and his attorney
this is not a favorable situation.
The United States Army has added a unique aspect to their
general courts-martial by providing law officers (trial judges)
assigned from judicial areas or circuits and these officers serve in
this capacity as a primary duty.5 They are comparable to circuit
judges and travel throughout their assigned area presiding at
general courts-martial to the exclusion of all other judge advocates.
The Air Force does not follow this system of specialization but
allows the general court-martial convening authority the discre-
tion of appointing any judge advocate from his or any other
command as a law officer provided there is not a conflict of interest
or other factor affecting his eligibility and he is certified for such
duty by The Judge Advocate General. By using this system, the
Air Force maintains a large number of judge advocates reasonably
well versed in the duties and responsibilities of this position as
well as the latest developments in military law while the Army
relies on the selective few chosen to perform this duty exclusively.
It is not the purpose of this paper to debate the policy of
either service but rather to set forth a proposal for more beneficial
utilization of the law officer in a revised court-martial system. As
stated before, the summary court-martial is becoming pass6 and
the special court-martial has its obvious faults; therefore, let us
consider a combination of the two courts. In this regard, it is
5 Mummey and Meagler, Jr., judges in Uniform: An Independent Judiciary,
for the Army, 44 J. Amer. Judicature Society 46 (1960); Wiener, The Army s
Field Judiciary System: A Notable Advance, 46 A.B.A.J. 1178 (November 1960).
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suggested that the term special court be retained while the
present term summary court be deleted from the system, and
that court be abolished. The special court-martial under this
proposal retains the powers now ascribed to it under UCMJ
except for the changes herein noted. Further, the rights of each
accused with regard to appointed counsel, additional counsel,
delays, verbatim records, automatic appeal, and enlisted personnel
on the court, are unchanged. The officers of the court consist of
a properly certified judge advocate as the presiding law officer
(trial judge), similar to his civilian counterpart in a court of
original jurisdiction; a trial counsel (prosecutor), defense counsel
assigned to represent the accused, and court reporter. Both
counsel to be certified in accordance with Article 27b of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. The law officer would have
authority to conduct pretrial hearings so that preliminary matters
could be disposed of and the issues to be presented at trial out-
lined. Such a hearing should be held only with the consent of the
accused and his counsel and not with a view to restricting any
defense trial tactics. During the actual trial the law officer rules
on all matters of evidence and is the trier of fact unless the
accused requested a jury, in which case a court of officers and
enlisted men, if requested by the accused, would be impaneled to
hear his case. Under this proposal the court or jury hears the
case and after proper instruction on the law by the law officer,
render a finding of guilty or not guilty. If a finding of guilty is
entered, then the jury is excused. After an opportunity to submit
matters in mitigation and extenuation has been afforded to the
accused the law officer adjudges sentence. This sentence is to be
within the limits which are now prescribed for a special court-
martial, except that a punitive discharge is not authorized.
Hence, the accused could have trial by either law officer or
jury, with the former having complete power to adjudge the
sentence as is common in the Federal Criminal Court.6 Further
the law officer should have the independent authority to suspend
all or any portion of the sentence he adjudges. By this method a
certain degree of uniformity within the same jurisdiction may be
obtained. In addition, it would interject the thinking of an
6 Fed. R. Cr. P. 32, 18 U.S.C.A.
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independent third party concerning matters pertaining to sen-
tencing. The convening authority retains the discretionary au-
thority he now has both with regard to findings and sentence.
Thus the special court-martial could become a tribunal similar
to civilian criminal courts of limited jurisdiction and provide the
features of certified counsel for both the government and the
accused, an actual jury and a judge empowered much like his
civilian counterparts. Further, eliminating the authority of the
special court-martial to adjudge a punitive discharge would in-
crease its effectiveness as the proper tribunal for all minor offenses.
It is also submitted that while command influence is sometimes
considered a challenge to the fairness of any military judicial
proceeding, such challenge could be eliminated by placing the
law officer outside the command of the convening authority. This
requirement might cause a personnel problem in certain remote
areas but the term "circuit rider" is not unfamiliar to the
judiciary and certainly could be utilized in the military. Further,
certified law officers from the other Armed Forces might be util-
ized with proper coordination. Surely, we cannot fail to recognize
that a shortage of lawyers in the military service may be a problem
concerning this entire -suggestion-but not an insurmountable
problem.
The problem of records of trial may be partially solved by
requiring a verbatim record only in contested special court-martial
cases and all general court-martial cases. In addition, an automatic
review of such cases by the Board of Review should be a require-
ment. Under this proposal the accused would be benefited by
having his case recorded and reviewed regardless of the discharge
factor. The present verbatim record requirement exists only for
general courts-martial and all special courts-martial adjudging a
punitive discharge. This includes uncontested cases where there
are certainly not many errors committed. However, contested
cases where issues are raised and litigated are the ones deserving
of the verbatim requirement regardless of the sentence adjudged.
Concerning a general court-martial only a slight change is
proposed. If the convening authority desired that the case be
heard before a court with power to adjudge a punitive discharge,
referral of the case to a general court-martial would be necessary.
The only difference in this proposal and the present system other
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than the aforementioned pretrial conference would be to empower
the law officer of the general court-martial with the authority to
sentence based on the recommendation of the court. After the
mitigation portion of the trial, the court itself announces a
recommended sentence, which by necessity would be within the
limits prescribed by the table of maximum punishments. The
law officer could reduce but not increase the recommended
sentence. This, of course, only after the court had made a finding
of guilty based on proper instructions by the law officer. Unlike
the special court-martial, there is no provision for the waiving of
a jury trial. Thus, before a punitive discharge could be adjudged
a court would have to make such a recommendation.
If the accused entered a plea of guilty after being advised of
his right to plead not guilty then the law officer would have the
authority to render a directed verdict and enter into the mitigat-
ing portion of the trial without undue procedural requirements.7
In addition, the law officer has authority to suspend any sentence
he might adjudge; the convening authority retaining his present
discretionary authority with regards to finding and sentence.
This proposal with regard to both the special and general
court-martial has as its aim protecting the rights of the individual
while eliminating certain present administrative burdens through
a streamlined system complimenting its civilian counterpart.
The utilization of certified law officers as the sole judges concern-
ing matters of evidence should generally benefit the accused, as
it places into the hands of a lawyer questions of law for his
decision rather than a layman which is the case in the present
special court-martial. This proposal also interjects an additional
person of independent authority into the sentencing procedure
with the power to suspend the sentence he adjudges. This would
make for more uniformity in sentencing and provide an addi-
tional opportunity for leniency on behalf of the accused.
The requirement of a verbatim record in every contested case
benefits the accused while the directed verdict cases in general
courts-martial and the non-verbatim uncontested special courts-
martial cases eliminates a vast amount of paper-work. Also the
utilization of the one man judge and jury type of special court-
7 Scbrader, The Directed Finding Through Judicial Legislation, 2 J.A.G. Bul.
40 (1960).
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martial could very easily contribute to the solution of the
problems presented by a general mobilization. Here we would
have a flexible system where one lawyer could be utilized to try
several cases in the time required under our present system to
try one case, without the administrative problem generated by a
special court-martial.
In conclusion, it is submitted that basically we have a good
system of justice in the Armed Forces, but it can be improved.
In viewing the entire scope of our present system one of the
greatest hardships is caused by the administrative burdens which
have been created. If these can to some extent be eliminated
without jeopardizing the rights of any persoi seeking justice,
without compromising the very rights for which our form of
government stands, one of which is equal justice for all under
the law, then a service is done for all those who are subject to the
UCMJ. To this end, we should strive, lawyer and layman alike,
to make our system of military justice the finest in the world
guaranteeing to all concerned the same rights and privileges that
are afforded his civilian neighbors.
